“We will help build the capacity of the most vulnerable states and communities to defeat terrorists locally....”

ABOUT NEPTUNE

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PURPOSE & BACKGROUND

This study supports Neptune’s analysis of Defense and State Department “programs that support U.S. investment in transnational and trans-regional capacity.” The purpose of this study is to analyze the effectiveness and the measures of effectiveness of existing authorities that support regional stability with U.S. partner nations. Specifically, this study focuses on U.S. government authorities and programs relevant to building partner capacity to enhance regional stability and defend U.S. interests against transnational threats. The key tasks are to:

- Conduct an inventory of relevant authorities;
- Inventory stakeholders and map their organizational construct;
- Assess coordination of relevant efforts; and,
- Assess measures of effectiveness on relevant efforts.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Since the 11 September 2001 attacks, security cooperation has gained renewed priority, shifting from secondary activities to “an integral element of the DoD’s mission.” As the Department of Defense (DoD) has recognized the increasing necessity of partnerships to affect strategic outcomes, it has also increasingly focused on the need to improve the tools that support building partner capacity (BPC). This study inventoried the critical authorities enabling security assistance and cooperation efforts, which provide the framework for U.S. attempts to build partner capacity. The overriding observation of this study is that the myriad activities occurring under a range of authorities are largely disconnected from a coherent and adaptable strategy designed to address identifiable strategic end-states.

With few means to assess whether security cooperation activities are achieving objectives, a patchwork of authorities developed over decades. These processes and corresponding infrastructure were designed around a slowly evolving environment (the Cold War), where the basic threat vectors changed little from year to year. Despite the radical shift in the global security landscape since the turn of the century, these decades-old building blocks remain the foundation of the modern Security Sector Assistance (SSA) paradigm. While achieving tactical objectives, SSA does not have the tools to seamlessly apply the various activities in a rational concept of operations working towards clearly defined strategic goals.

The existing SSA infrastructure is not only outdated and dysfunctional, but also largely ineffective where it seeks to build partner capacity in fragile, high-threat environments. And yet, this is increasingly what is being asked of this infrastructure. Where SSA seeks to make gradual improvements to existing capabilities (Colombia, Philippines, etc.) it is generally seen as effective. Elsewhere, where SSA is employed to purchase access or influence (Pakistan, Israel, Oman, etc.), it is also generally effective in this more modest and transactional mode. However, where SSA seeks to “build” new capability (Yemen, Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan, etc.) in high-risk theaters with political instability, the programs have been moderately effective at best, or ineffective at worst.

Numerous attempts have been made in the last decade to “update” this paradigm and make it more responsive and agile to the current threat environment. However, recent innovations have received mixed reviews and done nothing to clarify strategic goals.

In addition, while many find the disjointed system of SSA ineffective, many actors resist change in the system or restructuring of authorities. Each bureaucracy that has a stake in the allocation of resources utilizing these authorities will often jealously guard the unique nature of these “stovepipes” because it gives them a vote on policy decisions.

While too many seats at the table confuse strategic goals, the growing reliance on “partnerships” and “building partner capacity” also remains in tension with DoD’s core requirement to be prepared to win our nation’s war in the more classic model of state-on-state conflict. Additionally, the legacy struggle between Title 10 and Title 22 authorities has become exacerbated by the “patchwork” and the “proliferation” of new Defense authorities, with renewed concerns by the Department of State (DoS) over the “militarization of foreign policy.” Without resolution, DoD will continue to struggle to resource and organize the military to support both pillars one (win our nation’s wars) and two (BPC) of the Quadrennial Defense Review’s (QDR) strategic framework.

This study inventories both the existing authorities and identifies the shortfalls in the overall framework of security assistance, cooperation, and building partner state capacity in order to inform senior decision makers of the existing conditions. The ultimate purpose of the study is to allow decision makers to look at ways to close gaps in strategy, concepts of operations, infrastructure, and data collection and presentation. This will set conditions and improve understanding to guide future policies and investments to develop and implement strategies and supporting programs to safeguard the U.S. and partners, and to provide international stability.
OVERVIEW

The foundation of the modern Security Sector Assistance (SSA) framework derives from the Cold War, when the U.S. was principally interested in buttressing the existing capabilities of, and improving interoperability with, its close allies. Specifically, the roots of the modern system derive from the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 and Arms Export Control Act of 1976, and its enduring authorities that have since been codified in Title 22 of U.S. Code, such as Foreign Military Sales (FMS), Foreign Military Financing (FMF), International Military Education and Training (IMET), etc.—all developed during the Cold War, a time of slowly evolving threats. The implementation of these Department of State authorities came to rest within the Department of Defense, which created the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) in 1961 to manage these programs. After five decades and seismic changes in the global security environment, vintage laws continue to govern and provide the basis for 21st century security assistance.

Various legislative and policy changes have attempted to modernize the SSA paradigm to keep pace with the threat environment. The most recent innovations, to include “1206” (now 2282) “train and equip,” Global Security Contingency Fund (GSCF), and Counterterrorism Partnership Fund (CTPF), have received mixed reviews and assessments that generally fall along predictable parochial lines. Nonetheless, there is broad consensus that the current framework has become a cumbersome “patchwork” of authorities atop an outdated foundation. Many expected, or at least hoped, that the second decade of the 21st century would bring relief from the post-9/11 fatigue of foreign crisis and engagements and that this lull would allow the national security apparatus to “reset” itself and prepare for a new model of conflict in the 21st century. However, the pace of escalating global conflict in recent years defied those expectations, leaving little bandwidth or space to do more than add to, or tinker with, the “patchwork” framework.

Figure 1. Global Security Cooperation

The U.S. assists over 100 countries with some form of security cooperation. The map below shows countries that have received one aspect of that assistance, Foreign Military Financing (FMF), over the last five years.
The existing SSA infrastructure is not only outdated and dysfunctional, it is also seen as ineffective in tackling the growing mission of building partner capacity in fragile, high-threat environments. SSA is generally seen as effective when making gradual improvements to some existing capabilities in countries such as in Colombia and the Philippines and in countries where SSA is used to purchase access or influence (Pakistan, Israel, Oman, etc). In contrast, applying SSA in high-risk theaters with fragile political institutions (Yemen, Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan, etc.) to build new capability has shown little success.

Despite much criticism of a system often deemed ineffective, many stakeholders resist change for parochial reasons. In fact, there are many actors who are better able to exercise perceived control of and oversight of policy by utilizing the patchwork. Bureaucratic elements often jealously guard the unique nature of these “stovepipe” authorities because it provides influence over policy decisions via the control or vote on the allocation of resources using such authorities. In addition, each authority reports to a congressional committee and provides an oversight mechanism that the congressional staffs will often strongly defend in the face of reform initiatives. As such, additional authorities are added that only marginally contribute to total effort but do not streamline or incorporate previous and existing authorities.

The growing reliance on “partnerships” and “building partner capacity” strains the Department of Defense’s ability to carry out its core requirement to be prepared to win our nation’s war in the more classic model of state-on-state conflict. In some cases, the partnership and BPC paradigm is being leveraged to return to the conventional security paradigm of preparing for state-on-state conflict, as in the case of the new South China Sea authority in the FY16 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA). But elsewhere, and particularly in the Middle East and North Africa, the Defense Department will continue to struggle to resource and organize the military to support both pillars one (win our nation’s wars) and two (build partner capacity) of the QDR’s strategic framework. This tension could be reconciled through a “partnership” model of defense (The Center for Strategic and International Studies terms this “federated defense”) that applies to both paradigms of conflict and both pillars of the QDR. In many ways, the South China Sea authority represents this way of thinking. However, critics of this approach suggest that the U.S. has already ceded too much leadership and influence, and exercised too much restraint, as evidenced by the rise of Russian assertiveness relative to Eastern Europe and the Middle East.

Structurally, as DoD authorities increase and DoS legislation lags, the long-running tension between State and Defense grows. This is a complex problem with multiple root causes. Chief among them are the legacy stovepipes of authorities (Title 10 vs. Title 22) and oversight committees (Armed Services vs. Foreign Affairs), the lack of State expeditionary resources to civilian-based security sector assistance, and a perceived lack of State agility and interagency/White House coordination of efforts. In addition, in the absence of a common operating picture and tools to process the flood of critical data, there is no refinement of strategic goals into complementary concepts of operations applied against a common operational picture. Other actors such as State National Guard units, the Drug Enforcement Administration and the intelligence community are employing Titles 32, 21, and 50, respectively, in largely disconnected and often uncommunicated endeavors.
SSA initiatives are ideally a balance between Department of State and Department of Defense efforts, with security programs a part of broader programs that contribute to overall governance and stability. Current SSA is perceived to be playing a dominant role led by DoD.

Thus, there is a clear problem with process-related issues, such as the speed, efficiency and coordination of security assistance. Of these, speed has received the most attention, as the fast-changing nature of the security challenges has placed emphasis on the ability to deliver new capabilities more rapidly and with greater agility. Coordination, or alignment of priorities and resources, is the second greatest concern, and there is general consensus that this does not occur at the global scale, although it is reasonably well managed within theaters or regions, and also within individual countries. Third is the question of efficiency, or the gaps and redundancies among authorities. This is less an issue, as while it does make the process more cumbersome, innovation or a mosaic of authorities can generally overcome gaps. There is very little concern with excess, or overlapping, authority.

This report looks at a series of tactical steps that could be taken to improve aspects of security assistance, security cooperation, and building partner capacity. Each of these are worth considering in their own right, but the challenges call out for a more strategic approach. There appear to be only two worthwhile avenues to address weaknesses in the current efforts. The first is to seek to streamline and make common the authorities that are applied against the requirements of security cooperation. This has been attempted in one form or fashion in every effort at reform since 9/11. The problem with this method is that it shortchanges the legitimate concerns of stakeholders in the current patchwork of authorities and oversight. The other method is to address the framework for analysis through the establishment of a common lexicon and methodologies for information management and the storage, manipulation, and display of data to conduct analysis and to develop concepts of operation that can employ myriad authorities in concert to achieve strategic goals. This second course of action appears to be the most promising avenue to employ the many authorities and approaches outlined in this study and to address the gaps and shortfalls within and between these tools.
Discussions of U.S. Security Sector Assistance are often hampered by confusion over definitions and terminology. This misunderstanding is improving, however, and a simple set of terms that is becoming increasingly utilized and accepted follows:

- **Security Sector Assistance (SSA)** is a modern umbrella term, codified by Presidential Policy Directive 23 (PPD-23, below), which captures aspects of both security assistance (State-led programs) and security cooperation (Defense-led or -implemented) programs.

- **Building Partner Capacity (BPC)** is a modern term that refers to U.S. efforts to enhance or create important capabilities within the military and civilian institutions of a partner government. This term is broader than security assistance, in that it can refer to non-security assistance, but it is also narrower than security assistance, in that it refers only to assistance designed to build real capability, which is a subset of all security assistance.

- **Security assistance** is a group of State-led programs authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and the Arms Export Control Act of 1976, as amended, or other related statutes by which the United States provides defense articles, military training, and other defense-related services by grant, loan, credit, or cash sales in furtherance of national policies and objectives.

- **Security cooperation** refers to activities undertaken by the Department of Defense to encourage and enable international partners to work with the United States to achieve strategic objectives, which includes all DoD interactions with foreign defense and security establishments, including all DoD-administered security assistance programs, that build defense and security relationships and that promote specific U.S. security interests, including all international armaments cooperation activities and security assistance activities.

- **Foreign internal defense** is an older term referring to participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government or other designated organization to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats to its security.

- **Security force assistance** is a doctrinal term referring to DoD activities that contribute to unified action by the USG to support the development of the capacity and capability of foreign security forces and their supporting institutions.

Of note, the U.S. military is updating its formal lexicon via a new volume “JP 3-XX: Security Cooperation” in the Joint Pub series. Joint Staff J7 and J5 are leading an effort to revise this doctrine, however the work is reported to be well intentioned but struggling.
United States policy on Security Sector Assistance is aimed at strengthening the ability of the United States to help allies and partner nations build their own security capacity, consistent with the principles of good governance and rule of law. The United States has long recognized that the diversity and complexity of the threats to our national interest require a collaborative approach, both within the United States Government and among allies, partners, and multilateral organizations. More than ever before, the U.S. shares security responsibilities with other nations and groups to help address security challenges in their countries and regions, whether it is fighting alongside our forces, countering terrorist and international criminal networks, participating in international peacekeeping operations, or building institutions capable of maintaining security, law, and order, and applying justice. U.S. assistance to build capabilities to meet these challenges can yield critical benefits, including reducing the possibility that the United States or partner nations may be required to intervene abroad in response to instability.

However, no single SSA strategy for the U.S. government exists at the national level. While security assistance is woven into the subordinate plans, such as the Joint Staff Joint Strategy Capabilities Plan (JSCP) and its subordinate Theater Campaign Plans (TCPs) or Theater Security Cooperation Programs (TSCPs), a review of the major overarching security strategies across the government does not reveal a clear design or coherence to the purpose of U.S. security assistance.

 Nonetheless, SSA is a prominent aspect of other national security reference documents. For instance, the following are relevant excerpts from the reference documents that frame current U.S. policy with regard to SSA activities:

**National Security Strategy (NSS) (2015)** link
- “We will help build the capacity of the most vulnerable states and communities to defeat terrorists locally. Working with the Congress, we will train and equip local partners and provide operational support to gain ground against terrorist groups. This will include efforts to better fuse and share information and technology as well as to support more inclusive and accountable governance.”
- “We will strengthen U.S. and international capacity to prevent conflict among and within states.”
- “...we will continue to work with partners and through multilateral organizations to address the root causes of conflict before they erupt and to contain and resolve them when they do. We prefer to partner with those fragile states that have a genuine political commitment to establishing legitimate governance and providing for their people. The focus of our efforts will be on proven areas of need and impact, such as inclusive politics, enabling effective and equitable service delivery, reforming security and rule of law sectors, combating corruption and organized crime, and promoting economic opportunity...”
- “We will continue to bolster the capacity of the U.N. and regional organizations to help resolve disputes, build resilience to crises and shocks, strengthen governance, end extreme poverty, and increase prosperity, so that fragile states can provide for the basic needs of their citizens and can avoid being vulnerable hosts for extremism and terrorism.”
Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) (2014) link

- “Build Security Globally. Continuing a strong U.S. commitment to shaping world events is essential to deter and prevent conflict and to assure our allies and partners of our commitment to our shared security. This global engagement is fundamental to U.S. leadership and influence.”

Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR) (2015) link

- “Ensuring accountable security sector governance. The April 2013 Presidential Policy Directive on security sector assistance (SSA) describes the State Department as the lead agency responsible for the policy, supervision, and general management of the U.S. government’s SSA and the congressional appropriation for SSA, (with the exception of DoD SSA appropriations), including integration of interagency efforts and other related assistance activities. The Department and USAID, in collaboration with Defense, Justice, Treasury, Homeland Security and others, help our partners’ security agencies and oversight bodies become more effective at deterring aggression, responding after a disaster, preventing and responding to human trafficking, reducing the illicit proliferation of arms, combating poaching, securing borders against illegal trafficking, and countering terrorism. Through assistance, the United States also seeks to make sure that security forces are an effective part of the criminal justice system, operating under the control of civilian leadership, meeting standards of transparency and accountability, and respecting international law, including international human rights law and humanitarian norms. The Department’s ‘Leahy vetting’ procedures are intended to ensure that U.S. assistance does not go to security personnel who have committed gross human rights violations such as extrajudicial killings, torture, and rape.”

- “Security assistance to military and law enforcement bodies is an important tool in the Department’s efforts to increase stability in conflict affected countries. Through financial assistance, training, and the provision of equipment, we enable our partners to safeguard their people, support peacekeeping, and defend against and pursue violent extremists.”


- “United States policy on Security Sector Assistance is aimed at strengthening the ability of the United States to help allies and partner nations build their own security capacity, consistent with the principles of good governance and rule of law. The United States has long recognized that the diversity and complexity of the threats to our national interest require a collaborative approach, both within the United States Government and among allies, partners, and multilateral organizations. More than ever before, we share security responsibilities with other nations and groups to help address security challenges in their countries and regions, whether it is fighting alongside our forces, countering terrorist and international criminal networks, participating in international peacekeeping operations, or building institutions capable of maintaining security, law, and order, and applying justice. U.S. assistance to build capabilities to meet these challenges can yield critical benefits, including reducing the possibility that the United States or partner nations may be required to intervene abroad in response to instability.”
STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK

One of the most consistent issues identified among experts is the lack of a coordinated U.S. government strategy for security sector assistance. There is a general sense, articulated in the above doctrinal sources, of why the U.S. government engages in security assistance, but there is little clarity or coherence, or top-down strategy, as to why the current array of programs and activities is structured the way it is. When pressed, most experts portray a bottom-up process, whereby country teams and regional leadership (Ambassadors, COCOMs, Defense and State bureaus, etc.) lobby for certain programs in certain countries based on a regional strategy.

While some regions are stronger in their strategic design than others, generally there is decent alignment at the regional level between the strategic resources, design and the objectives. However, no such alignment exists at the global level across all regions. This situation is a direct result of both the independent nature of individual ambassadors and the regional power of the geographic combatant commanders. The place where this divergence is supposed to be rationalized is the Global Employment of the Force (GEF), but that document is purely a DoD document, even though State has participated in its formulation in the past. It also lacks synergy with political leadership who tend to be reactive in where their energy and guidance is focused.

To resolve this issue and force the executive branch to enact a more deliberate approach to SSA, the House and Senate have taken to mandating the Secretary of Defense develop a “strategic framework” for security cooperation, as in Section 1202 of the FY16 NDAA (sidebar).

SEC. 1202. STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK FOR DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE SECURITY COOPERATION. (link to FY16 NDAA)

(a) STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK.

(1) IN GENERAL—The Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Secretary of State, shall develop and issue to the Department of Defense a strategic framework for Department of Defense security cooperation to guide prioritization of resources and activities.

(2) ELEMENTS.—The strategic framework required by paragraph (1) shall include the following:

(A) Discussion of the strategic goals of Department of Defense security cooperation programs, overall and by combatant command, and the extent to which these programs—

(i) support broader strategic priorities of the Department of Defense; and

(ii) complement and are coordinated with Department of State security assistance programs to achieve United States Government goals globally, regionally, and, if appropriate, within specific programs.

(B) Identification of the primary objectives, priorities, and desired end-states of Department of Defense security cooperation programs.

(C) Identification of challenges to achieving the primary objectives, priorities, and desired end-states identified under subparagraph (B), including—

(i) constraints on Department of Defense resources, authorities, and personnel;

(ii) partner nation variables and conditions, such as political will, absorptive capacity, corruption, and instability risk, that impact the likelihood of a security cooperation program achieving its primary objectives, priorities, and desired end-states;

(iii) constraints or limitations due to bureaucratic impediments, interagency processes, or congressional requirements:

(iv) validation of requirements; and

(v) assessment, monitoring, and evaluation.

(D) A methodology for assessing the effectiveness of Department of Defense security cooperation programs in making progress toward achieving the primary objectives, priorities, and desired end-states identified under subparagraph (B), including an identification of key benchmarks for such progress.

(E) Any other matters the Secretary of Defense determines appropriate.

(3) FREQUENCY.—The Secretary of Defense shall, at a minimum, update the strategic framework required by paragraph (1) on a biennial basis and shall update or supplement the strategic framework as appropriate to address emerging priorities.

(b) REPORT.

(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and on a biennial basis thereafter, the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Secretary of State, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on the strategic framework required by subsection (a).

(2) FORM.—The report required by paragraph (1) shall be submitted in an unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.

(3) DEFINITION.—In this subsection, the term “appropriate congressional committees” means—

(A) the congressional defense committees; and

(B) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives.
SSA TAXONOMY

SSA is a broad term, encompassing over 100 authorities and an even greater number of programs. Most SSA programs are generally correlated to a single discrete authority, but programs occasionally need to “cobble together” several authorities to cover several different types of activities under one program. Programs generally fund certain types of activities toward a specific purpose, as follows:

Activity Types. Based on previous research by the RAND Corporation, 12 general activity types can be broken down into four basic sub-groups:

- Cooperation
  - Information Exchange
  - RDT&E
- Equipping
  - Construction
  - Equipment
  - Provide Air/Sealift
  - Supplies
- Mil-Mil Exchange
  - Conferences & Workshops
  - Defense/Military Contacts
  - Personnel Exchanges
- Training
  - Education
  - Exercises
  - Training

Purpose Types. Similarly, activities can be categorized as pursuing one of several specific functional purposes:

- Aviation Expertise
- Border Security
- Coalition Support
- Counterinsurgency
- Counter Narcotics
- Counterterrorism
- Counter Threat Finance
- Counter-WMD
- Cyber Security
- Defense Institution Building
- De-Mining
- Disaster Relief
- Health
- Humanitarian Assistance
- Intelligence
- Interoperability
- Law Enforcement
- Maritime Security
- Missile Defense
- Peacekeeping
- Port Security
- Research and Development
- Stabilization and Reconstruction

For this study, authorities were only considered if they directly or indirectly contributed to counterterrorism or regional stability operations, which generally excluded activities with a purpose of de-mining, disaster relief, health, humanitarian assistance, missile defense, or cyber security.

Strategic Goals. The most contentious and confusing aspect of security sector assistance is the issue of what the assistance is intended to accomplish. Congressional demand for a “strategic framework” for security cooperation stemmed from the fact that it was not clear, nor could the DoD explain what it was attempting to do with security cooperation at the global, strategic level. For instance, and despite the now widespread use of “building partner capacity,” the majority of U.S. security assistance does not seek, as its principle goal, to build partner capacity. Further, the largest security assistance account is Foreign Military Financing (FMF), which generally “buys” things other than capacity, such as influence and access.
In an attempt to clarify and integrate the intent of SSA, the SSA PPD (PPD-23) created a framework of SSA goals, in four parts:

1. Help partner nations build sustainable capacity to address common security challenges;
2. Promote partner support for U.S. interests;
3. Promote universal values, such as good governance, and;
4. Strengthen collective security and multinational defense arrangements and organizations.

The following five-part methodology improves on that framework by distinguishing between traditional (pre-9/11) and modern “partner” requirements:

1. **Legacy Assistance.** This term refers to those aspects of security assistance that are relatively fixed as a function of a broader diplomatic agreement or expectation, such as the U.S. FMF assistance to Egypt and Israel, which was brokered in the Camp David accords, whereby the U.S. essentially “bought” peace through the guarantee of indefinite provision of security assistance.

2. **Access and Influence.** In these cases, the real U.S. objective is one of strategic access or influence, rather than the delivery of capability. This is the case with modern assistance to Pakistan and Oman, whereby the U.S. gains a cooperative relationship of a strategic nature that supersedes, in theory, the relative weight of the actual assistance.

3. **Allied Interoperability and Capability.** This refers to assistance to allied states, whereby the U.S. ensures interoperability and capability within those forces it may someday be allied with in conflict.

4. **Fragile State Capability.** This category addresses the modern demand behind the 1206 authority and the concept of “building partner capacity.” These nations are scarcely “partners” in the traditional sense, but they require security and governance capability augmentation to counter non-state actors that pose a threat to the state and the broader international community.

5. **Regional and Multilateral Support.** This category recognizes that regional approaches are required in many modern conflict areas, and assistance must also be directed at regional and multilateral entities.
Security assistance authorities exist in two forms, either formalized in U.S. Code (Title 10 or 22) or enacted by legislation, typically in annual Defense Authorizations bills. Where authorities have specific funding appropriated, corresponding defense appropriations legislation specifies amounts and further limitations on the funding. Moreover, authorities are often renewed and revised annually. Thus modern SSA program managers must often account for multiple authorities relevant to each program, each of which may be defined by several years’ worth of authorization legislation, and funding by several years’ worth of appropriations legislation. This methodology makes program management exceedingly complex, as each authority has different limitations, and different types of appropriations may expire across several years.

Old Authorities. Of note, there are several “old” authorities that have expired but retain residual funding or are still in execution, to include 1206, Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP), Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capability Fund (PCCF), and Iraq Security Force Fund (ISFF). Some of these authorities have been extended under new, formalized authorities (1206 to 2282, and ISFF to ITEF (Iraq Train and Equip)) whereas others, such as PCCF and CERP, have no follow-on authority and are simply in the final stages of funding expenditure. While these authorities are expired, they are still maintained in DSCA databases due to the continuation of residual funding, so they are also accounted for in this project authority database.

New Authorities. The FY16 NDAA has one new substantive SSA authority on the South China Sea, but it is unrelated to transnational threats or counterterrorism. While this authority is not directly relevant to Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict (SOLIC), its enactment was illustrative of many issues within the SSA debate. It was motivated in part to follow-through on a desire to have SSA funding follow the “pivot” to Asia and to address the growing assertiveness of China in the South China Sea. However, the SSA authority was developed exclusively within the Armed Services committees, and was never briefed to the Foreign Affairs committees, despite its obvious foreign policy implications. To many, the way the authority was conceived demonstrates disconnects between the State and Defense congressional committees. The problem appears to be more acute on the Senate side, where the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (SFRC) and the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) work less closely than the House Foreign Affairs Committee (HFAC) and the House Armed Services Committee (HASC), although SASC staffers said that this was less true on regional issues than functional ones. A significant problem for the State Department is the requirement for State to pay for a certain percentage of the program. This is a hindrance when dollars are in short supply and often committed in Title 22 multi-year programs. State is constrained from a budget standpoint and is therefore less enthusiastic and responsive when there is a responsibility to cost share with DoD. State is much more responsive and their committees more cooperative in coordinating programs when the funding in question is exclusively DoD Title 10, as with ISFF and Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF) funds in Iraq and Afghanistan.

In addition to the South China Sea authority, there are four to five potential new authorities in the FY16 NDAA, to include an extension of CERP, Office of Security Cooperation-Iraq (OSC-I), support for Iraqi forces combatting the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL),
and renewed support to Latin America. The current authorities’ inventory does not include these pending new authorities.

**Authorities Reform Issues.** In addition to the pending new authorities, the most substantive issue in authorities development are 1) an effort by DoD to consolidate SSA authorities and 2) an open question as to whether to institutionalize the GSCF authority, which is in its final year of a 4-year “prototype” (the recently signed FY16 NDAA extends GSCF through September 2017, which defers the debate on institutionalizing this authority).

**Counterterrorism Partnership Fund (CTPF).** The most controversial of recent SSA authority decisions was the rapid conceptualization and implementation of the CTPF, which was proposed by the President in a major policy speech at West Point on May 28, 2014. In theory, the CTPF is designed to “transition to a more sustainable and partnership-focused approach to counterterrorism with a flexible mechanism that allows DoD to respond more nimbly to evolving terrorist threats” (from the DoD FY16 J-Book). CTPF was originally intended by the White House to focus on non-security efforts in governance and rule of law, but Congress did not fund those aspects of the original White House request. The final FY15 program was $1.3B for a 2-year program in the Middle East and Africa (minus Iraq) to (1) provide counterterrorism (CT) support to partner nations, including capacity-building and enabling support; (2) provide support to address the conflict in Syria and the impact on its neighbors through a Regional Stabilization Initiative, including support to the moderate Syrian opposition; and (3) help DoD respond to unexpected crises. In practice, CTPF has become an augmentation of funding into the 2282 authority, earmarked to specific regions, as DoD is using the 2282 process through DSCA to implement CTPF.

*Figure 3. Title 10 vs. Title 22 Security Assistance Authorities Over Time*

The number of DoD authorities has increased significantly and at a pace that far outstrips the number of DoS authorities. Meanwhile, the number of authorities that require both the DoD and DoS Secretaries in a joint matter has only been recently introduced.
STAKEHOLDERS

The following is a list of the principle U.S. government stakeholders primarily involved in SSA. This list does not include entities with secondary equities, as that would expand to include much of the government. This list also does not include secondary agencies, such as DHS, DoJ, and Energy, with much smaller security assistance portfolios. A general schematic of the primary stakeholders is provided below.

At times the Joint Staff has appeared to be less consequential in the security cooperation realm, with responsibilities for this issue diluted within the DJ5 and across the Joint Staff. However this observation is not necessarily true in all cases, as the DJ5 staff can and should act as an extension of the COCOMs staff and represents them with the Global Force Management Board and as interlocutors in interagency discussions. They also provide input to the Chairman who has to recommend prioritization of these efforts since not enough resources exist to satisfy all the requests. Also of note, State Pol-Mil is about to undergo a critical loss of personnel with the departure of the Assistant Secretary and Principal Deputy for Security Cooperation. Finally, and as discussed below, the NSC role has been underwhelming, and most of the State-Defense coordination is occurring without significant NSC involvement.

I. Congressional Branch

- House Armed Services Committee (HASC)
- Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC)
- House Foreign Affairs Committee (HFAC)
- Senate Foreign Relations Committee (SFRC)
- House Appropriations Committee (HAC)
- Senate Appropriations Committee (SAC)

II. Executive Branch

- National Security Council (NSC)
  o Counterterrorism Directorate
  o Defense Directorate
  o Development and Democracy Directorate
- Office of Management and Budget (OMB)
- Department of State
  o Under Secretary for Political Affairs (P)
    ▪ Policy Planning
    ▪ Regional Bureaus
    ▪ Embassy Teams
  o Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security (T)
    ▪ Political-Military Affairs
  o Under Secretary for Civilian Security, Democracy and Human Rights (J)
    ▪ Conflict and Stabilization Operations (CSO)
    ▪ Counterterrorism (CT)
    ▪ Democracy, Human Rights and Labor (DRL)
    ▪ International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL)
  o Office of Foreign Assistance (F)
  o Legislative Affairs
  o Legal Office (L)
• U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) - Policy, Plans and Learning
  • Department of Defense
    o Under Secretary for Policy
      ▪ Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict
      ▪ International Security Affairs
      ▪ Asia-Pacific Security Affairs
      ▪ Strategy, Plans, Capabilities
        ✷ Security Cooperation
        ✷ Defense Security Cooperation Agency
      ▪ Strategy, Plans and Forces
    o Under Secretary Acquisition, Technology and Logistics
    o Under Secretary Personnel & Readiness
    o Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation (CAPE)
    o Under Secretary/CFO (Comptroller)
    o Legislative Affairs
    o Office of General Counsel
  • Joint Staff
    o DJ5 DDGPP (Global Plans and Partnerships)
    o DJ7 Joint Force Development
      ▪ Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance (JCISFA)
    o DJ8
    o U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM)
    o Geographic COCOMs
  • Army
    o U.S. Army Security Assistance Command
    o Army Security Assistance Training Field Activity
  • Navy & Marine Corps
    o Navy International Programs Office
    o Naval Education and Training Security Assistance Field Activity
    o Marine Corps Security Cooperation Group
  • Air Force
    o Deputy Under Secretary of the Air Force for International Affairs
    o Air Force Security Assistance Command (AFSAC)
    o Air Force Security Assistance Training Squadron (AFSAT)
  • Defense Support Agencies
    o National Geospatial-intelligence Agency (NGA)
    o Defense Logistics Agency (DLA)
    o National Security Agency (NSA)
  • Directorate of National Intelligence
    o Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)
    o National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC)
      ▪ Directorate of Strategic Operational Planning (DSOP)
Figure 4. Organizational Mapping of Primary Stakeholders in Security Sector Assistance
RESOURCE & FUNDING DATA

There is widespread difficulty and frustration in aggregating resource and program data across the government to create a compiled analysis of how much funding is going to which activity types in which countries. Due to the combination of functional and regional categorizations in the budgeting process, neither DoD nor DoS appears able to present a “master” database of security assistance funding for counter-terrorism. For instance, the State International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCTL) account is managed by State-INL, and INL and the Office of Foreign Assistance (F) maintain records on funding by country and program, some of which is available on foreignassistance.gov (although the website is not yet fully populated). However, aggregating funding by purpose type, such as counterterrorism, is not readily possible. Nonetheless, it is possible to analyze funding by authority, and by country, which provides a general, albeit cumbersome, breakdown of funding allocation.

For instance, the funding for one of the largest SSA accounts (except ASFF), FMF, is compiled annually by State, according to recipient country:

Figure 5. FMF by Country (FY15 Request, in millions)

Source: Department of State

FMF continues to be dominated by the legacy commitments to Israel and Egypt. Congressional mandates also stipulate the next largest recipients, leaving little discretionary room within the FMF budget for regional reallocation. When the two largest recipients (Israel and Egypt) are removed, the remaining distribution of FMF is currently as follows:
If the next top four top recipients (Jordan, Pakistan, Iraq and Lebanon) are removed, the remaining distribution of FMF is as follows:

Source: Department of State
The defense community raised some concern with the “peanut butter” spreading of FMF in this manner, whereby regional bureaus and Combatant Commands (COCOMs) attempt to provide some modicum of security assistance to all countries within their region. Several interviewees raised the question as to whether it would be more effective to lump more of this assistance together into larger programs in fewer countries that were more pivotal to regional stability. These efforts to bundle resources has raised alarm bells amongst stakeholders. This is why not all actors think the system is ineffective with the patchwork of authorities. COCOMs and Country Teams do not have faith that all of their countries will receive some added resources and the patchwork does in fact act like peanut butter to help them maintain relations.

The above graph shows the total funding across five years of FY11 through FY15 for the largest DoD security cooperation (blue) and DoS security assistance (green) accounts. The State non-security accounts (yellow) of Economic Support Fund (ESF) and Development Assistance (DA) are also shown for contextual comparison.

Source: Department of State, Neptune Research
This graphical depiction of funding amounts demonstrates that the relative apportionment between Title 10 and Title 22 authorities is not significantly imbalanced, particularly if ASFF is excluded. The graph also highlights the non-security accounts that specifically seek to develop improved economic development and governance are relatively well-funded compared to the other security accounts.

Figure 10. 1206 Funding FY12-FY14 (in millions)

The above graphic illustrates the regional apportionment of 1206 funding across three years (FY12-FY14), demonstrating the growth of 1206 funding in a short period of time, and the exclusion of Asian and Latin American countries during this time period.
PROCESS & COORDINATION ISSUES

Overall, interagency coordination works reasonably well at the country and regional level, but is lagging at the national/global level. Neither State nor Defense has a formal process for coordinating security assistance/cooperation globally, although it occurs informally across regional and functional organizations. The exception to this regionalization of planning is the Global Employment of the Force (GEF) document at DoD that is supposed to rationalize efforts globally and prioritize focus. In fact, it often only codifies regional activities. At the State Department, the Office of Foreign Assistance (F) runs an annual “round-table” process to scrub funding requests across all regional bureaus, but this is a budgeting process vice a process to refine strategy. There is an expectation that the NSC should function as an interagency coordination mechanism, particularly after finalizing the SSA PPD in 2013, but the SSA Interagency Policy Committee (IPC) has not stepped forward in bringing coherence to the SSA strategy. The NSC is currently planning a policy process to adjudicate interagency concerns with the DoD proposal for authorities consolidation, but this project would have a relatively narrow scope.

Misconceptions subsist that NCTC/DSOP plays a coordination role in synchronizing the national CT strategies. Rather, NCTC simply compiles data on USG expenditures on programs related to CT efforts, but plays no real coordinating function. NCTC’s view is they provide that data to the NSC, who should be doing the coordinating. This confusion is analogous to the frustrations at SOCOM in attempting to execute its UCP role as the “synchronizer” of CONPLAN 7500.

In theory, theater security assistance objectives would be aligned with the national-level security assistance strategy. In many cases, a general, informal alignment exists, but there is no mechanism by which the full range of resources and activities are made consistent with the relative prioritization of national security priorities. The most prominent example is the relative spending between South Asia and the Middle East after the shift in threat from core al-Qa’ida in Pakistan and Afghanistan to ISIL and al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) in the Middle East. Despite the intelligence community having shifted its consensus that the greater transnational threat had moved to emanate from the Middle East, the bulk of CT resources continued to flow to South Asia. The annual Global Employment of the Force (GEF) guidance and other strategic planning tools provide some guidance and alignment, but these efforts remain indirect and with a broader focus than security assistance. Moreover, because security assistance has varying strategic intents, from access and influence to building partner capacity, it is difficult to expect resources and strategic priorities to align fully. These observations lead to the question of whether the consolidation of authorities should be a stretch goal and a more immediate effort should be to bring greater fidelity of guidance from the GEF to the Theater Security Cooperation plans. Limiting the ability to provide that greater fidelity is the lack of a common lexicon, common tools of data and information management and manipulation, and a common frame of reference in which to develop a common operating picture.

State & Defense Coordination. There are widely varying views as to whether the coordination processes are working well between State and Defense, particularly with regard to the 1206/2282 authority. OSD and Joint Staff both voiced significant improvements in codifying the 1206/2282 process between State and Defense, but COCOMs voiced concerns
about excessive bureaucratic difficulties. Where coordination is working well, it is generally
due to conducive personalities on both sides. However, State continues to be concerned
with DoD’s tendencies to “short-circuit” “coordination” or “consultation” requirements,
which are open to wide interpretation. State has found authorities with “concurrence”
requirements to be reasonably formal and robust—they are frustrated with the tendency
for “coordination” or “consultation” requirements to become the opposite, whereby those
mandates can be satisfied with as little as a phone call. A second State concern is the
tendency for DoD processes to obtain State coordination at the country team/ambassador
level, vice being coordinated in Washington, due to the often close relationships between
COCOMs and the country teams. This issue is demonstrated in DoD’s notional 1206
coordination process (below).

**Timeliness.** The timeliness of the 1206/2282 program has improved significantly, with
many activities being fielded within 12 months of congressional notification, which is
considerably better than the 3-year average for FMF programs. However, this speed only
speaks to the delivery timeline, which is essentially a function of the DSCA processes. The
approval timeline, which is how long it takes for a COCOM proposal to reach congressional
notification, is still frustratingly slow to COCOMs.

**Figure 11. 1206 Notional Planning Timeline**
The SSA infrastructure of executive agencies and Congress would ideally approve proposals within 3.5 – 6
months, a goal not currently being met.

Source: Department of Defense
ASSESSMENTS & EFFECTIVENESS

Assessment Methodologies and Measures of Effectiveness. Formal metrics of assessment for security assistance and cooperation do not yet exist at either State or Defense, although there are ongoing efforts to address this shortfall. The current DoD methodology, first mandated by and briefed to Congress in 2013, involves a series of “input” or qualitative metrics that were deemed insufficient by congressional staffers. To resolve this issue, OSD contracted with RAND to “recommend options for [OSD] to establish an assessment, monitoring, and evaluation (AME) regime for security cooperation programs.” This project conducted its first interim review and expects to complete work in the spring of 2016. RAND is building off a notional monitoring and evaluation framework proposed by OSD, which would evaluate inputs, activities, outputs, and outcome/effects. Based on their previous research (below) RAND’s proposed framework would build on this model to look at the security cooperation environment, performance (outputs), effectiveness (outcomes), and lessons learned, evaluating each at the strategic, country, and event levels.

The most sophisticated research on security assistance effectiveness has been conducted by RAND, often synthesized or summarized by the Congressional Research Service (CRS), and occasionally by the Government Accountability Office (GAO). RAND’s framework borrows from their Defense Sector Assessment Rating Tool (DSART), which offers a method for categorizing the objectives and sub-objectives of security assistance, and the relative level of partner nation capability. Rather than providing an absolute measure of where security assistance has succeeded and failed, RAND’s analysis (“What Works Best When Building Partner Capacity and Under What Circumstances?”) is most useful in surfacing common elements that make programs more effective than others.

RAND has also developed a theoretical framework and logic model that describes the key elements of effectiveness across each phase of security assistance (“A Build Partner Capacity Assessment Framework: Tracking Inputs, Outputs, Outcomes, Disrupters, and Workarounds”).

One of the most promising information system innovations in development by OSD is the Global Theater Security Cooperation Management Information System (G-TSCMIS), which could become a centralized database of security cooperation information, useful in planning and assessing security cooperation activities. G-TSCMIS was fielded in 2014 and is now managed by DSCA. RAND has begun utilizing G-TSCMIS data in its analysis of how well programs and activities align with strategic objectives, but the data remains incomplete and RAND has determined that it is not yet capable of quantitatively assessing the relationships between activities and objectives and resources. For instance, when RAND attempted to aggregate FY14 G-TSCMIS data for EUCOM, the total amount was a small fraction (10%) of the total amounts allocated in the DSCA security cooperation ledgers. G-TSCMIS has great potential and could either be modified in purpose and structure or become complementary to other data management to provide a stronger link from strategic goals to assessment to refinement of goals to link back to strategy.

The GAO is also initiating a study of security cooperation programs and effectiveness in anticipation of a future mandate to audit 1206 programs.
**Effectiveness.** Assessments of effectiveness are incomplete and anecdotal without a formal framework. Nonetheless, some general conclusions can be drawn from the data and literature available.

First, the question of whether a program is effective must begin by identifying what that program is designed to accomplish. BPC programs, such as exercises, that are intended to deliver access and improved relationship cannot be assessed based on the capability built in the partner nation. Thus, the strategic framework for SSA and a system of categorizing the goals of various programs are vitally important to any assessment methodology.

Second, GAO, RAND and CRS have conducted detailed assessments on particular programs and countries, but results are inconsistent. For instance, a GAO report on Lebanon (http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-13-289) concluded that “State has evaluated only one of its security assistance programs for Lebanon, the INCLE program; neither State nor DoD has completed plans or established time frames to evaluate the other programs.” RAND found that assessments of the same program vary widely from COCOM to COCOM. For instance, AFRICOM found that 1206 was highly effective but generally inefficient, whereas PACOM claimed exactly the opposite.

Third, the general consensus is that the process of delivering security assistance (efficiency) is much improved over recent years, while the outcomes of security assistance (effectiveness) are very much in doubt where the assistance is designed to “build partner capacity.” The most frequently cited concerns are:

1. Lack of political will or political stability by partner nation
2. Partner nation lacks civilian infrastructure to complement or leverage security assistance
3. Lack of partner nation ability to sustain equipment

The most frequently cited “success cases” are the Philippines and Colombia, and the most frequently cited failure cases are Syria, Yemen, Iraq, Afghanistan, Mali, Libya and South Sudan. Further, most discussions on the root causes of these successes or failures focus on the politics and civilian governance of the partner nation, not on the efficacy of the actual security assistance program or the actual capabilities inherent to the program.

RAND’s studies have found that material assistance (to include arms transfers) are more “problematic” than security assistance based on training and education, and that “weak and autocratic states have difficulty making positive use of security sector assistance, and in many studies, such assistance was found to have potentially destabilizing effects.”

Fourth, there is very little focus on the potential risks of security assistance, and a corresponding implementation of mitigation measures for those risks. RAND has developed the following list of risks specific to the potential for security assistance to undermine the political stability of a fragile partner nation:

1. Undermining legitimate governance
   a. Creation of “praetorian guards”
   b. Eroding the principle of civilian supremacy
   c. Rent-seeking and non-responsiveness
2. Exacerbating inter-communal tensions
   a. Shifting of inter-communal or inter-factional balance of power
   b. Internationalizing local conflicts
   c. Generating false perceptions
3. Diffusion of assistance to non-state actors
   a. Diffusion of arms and other material assistance
   b. Diffusion of training and other nonmaterial assistance
4. Abetting abuses
5. Moral hazard

Gordon Adams of the Stimson Center, recently concluded, “U.S. train-and-equip programs have not achieved great success in encouraging foreign military partners to operate and govern their regular armed forces in accordance with the rule of law and democratic norms, despite some training and rhetoric that includes this goal. Moreover, it is far from clear that these programs achieve even the more limited objectives of developing recipient country capability or giving the U.S. enduring influence. The primary content of these programs, particularly the large DoD effort, is providing equipment and associated training (T&E) to the recipient. For policymakers, this is seen as the most immediate way of providing assistance, as opposed to longer-term force development and security sector reform. However, for recipients, this may not be the most useful form of assistance, often leading to the deterioration of the equipment for lack of training, sustainable funding, or use.”
REFORM EFFORTS

The security assistance and security cooperation landscape has undergone rapid change and considerable upheaval since 2001. Based largely out of the frustrations borne out of experience in Afghanistan and Iraq that the security cooperation mechanisms were too slow to respond to the dynamic requirements of the 21st century, the Secretary of Defense directed USD P undergo a comprehensive review of the security cooperation system. The ensuing Security Cooperation Reform Task Force completed a report in July 2011 with more than 50 recommendations to make the security cooperation system more “anticipatory” vice “responsive,” and to make the system more agile to respond quickly to emerging requirements. Among the recommendations were four major initiatives:

1. **Special Defense Acquisition Fund (SDAF) Recapitalization and Reform.** Congress agreed in the fall of 2012 to recapitalize with $100M from the FMS trust fund and OSD is now looking to leverage the SDAF to enhance the speed by which certain types of security assistance (e.g. small arms) can be fast-tracked significantly faster than 2282 or FMF. The contracting process would not change, but by stock-piling articles that were anticipated as future requirements, those articles could be delivered in weeks or months rather than months or years.

2. **Expeditionary Requirements Generation Teams.** This recommendation sought to assist combatant commands working with partner nations to convert their capability requirements into letters of request to purchase U.S. defense articles.

3. **Special Defense Repair Fund (SDRF).** Akin to the SDAF, this recommendation resulted in a prototype authority, authorized in 2012, to repair defense stock items in anticipation of them being acquired through security cooperation mechanisms.

4. **Compressed Rapid Acquisition, Fielding and Training (CRAFT).** This recommendation sought to streamline the conventional DSCA processes to improve time to delivery.

Most of these 2011 reforms were focused on speed of delivery, and the current emphasis remains on improving the process and speed of security cooperation. In other words, the emphasis is on efficiency of the process, vice the effectiveness of the assistance. This tact is driven by the fact that the Secretary of Defense controls the process and reforms can be made in a reasonable timeframe.

Specifically, the most significant ongoing reform effort is one of authorities consolidation, promoted by OSD (legislative affairs and security cooperation offices). This concept has become controversial due to State concerns that a consolidation effort would “institutionalize” the gradual erosion of State's traditional Title 22 authority. To some extent, this has already occurred with the shifting of the 2006 NDAA “Section 1206” authority into Title 10, now codified as “Section 2282.” A consolidation, or cleaning up, effort is warranted given the “patchwork” nature of the existing authorities. However, this debate will nevertheless require resolution of the broader question of whether there has been, or should be, a fundamental shifting of responsibility for security assistance from State to Defense. Of note, the smaller COCOMs prefer the “patchwork” as it provides some measure of safeguarding their equities. This preference is not unique to the COCOMs as
the Ambassadors and associated regional bureaus at State prefer the current dispersion of resources too. That is, if the streamlining were to result in a generalization of authorities, some groups would lose the explicit mandate they currently enjoy, which would in turn result in more difficulty in competing for resources. Thus Defense and State are divided in their support of the consolidation effort, where OSD appears to support the initiative and the COCOMs are generally opposed, even though they frequently criticize the complexity of the “patchwork” status quo.
ADDITIONAL FINDINGS

A Flawed Imperative of BPC. On its surface, the logic of increasing U.S. investment in “building partner capacity” is straightforward and intuitively appealing:

- The U.S. has diminished political will to engage its own forces;
- The U.S. has decreasing defense budgets and can no longer afford to deploy its forces everywhere it needs them;
- The global threat environment is deteriorating and U.S. national security interests are at risk;
- Therefore, the U.S. must act to secure its interests, and the most effective and efficient means to do so is by increasing the capacity of partners to fight for U.S. interests.

Title 10 vs. Title 22. State perceives authority to have shifted in two basic ways: 1) new DoD authorities (i.e. 2282) that undercut State’s lead responsibility for security assistance planning, and 2) new DoD authorities that extend beyond assistance to “armed forces,” whereby DoD now has authority to train non-security forces. Generally speaking, Defense sees this as a necessary evolution of the security assistance system given the shifting nature of global threats. Specifically, Defense sees Title 22 authorities as diplomatic in nature, focused on relationship building as they have always been. By contrast, DoD sees the new Title 10 authorities as critical to filling real capability gaps that have a direct connection to U.S. national security interests. Moreover, they cite, in a time of significant budget constraints, increasing pressure and need to rely on partners and coalitions in this way. Finally, a very real connection exists between Title 10 and Title 22 authority growth and the relative level of activity (or inactivity) between the Armed Services and Foreign Affairs committees. State has not seen an authorizations bill in a decade, and the evolution of their authorities has not kept pace with the evolution of Defense committees. Many of the State authorities are relatively outdated, but their committees have not been successful in moving State authorization legislation through the system. Finally, and above all, Defense continues to stress the pragmatic urgency of the current situation, and State’s inability (due to lack of resources, not incompetence) to do industrial scale security cooperation work. For instance, Defense personnel typically concede that it is undesirable for U.S. military forces to be training civilian security personnel, but that this is better than it not being done, or the training being done by incompetent contractors.

“Concurrence” vs. “Coordination.” The reality of the shift in authorities is more complex than a simple erosion of State's traditional authority. The 1206 authority did provide Defense with a “train and equip” authority that had previously been a State responsibility under Title 22, but the 1206 authority did, as does the 2282 authority now, require State “concurrence” with the Defense-developed plan. So while the responsibility for the planning and programming has shifted to Defense, State also has a veto. In practice, this is not profoundly different than a State (Title 22) authority, such as FMS or IMET, which is implemented by DoD through DSCA. Previously, many DoD authorities had required either “coordination” or “consultation” with the State Department, which constituted a relatively weak requirement in practice, as those terms are poorly defined and could mean as little as a phone call notification. Concurrence, on the other hand, is a relatively formal requirement usually requiring written documentation. And the trend is toward joint, or
“concurrence” authorities, where State has a stronger hand in the planning.

**Timeliness vs. Design.** It was surprising to find that some senior leadership remains focused on the importance of rapid delivery of assistance rather than improving the planning of assistance, despite the fact that the prevailing view in outside studies is that planning issues (i.e. sustainment) remains the key issue for security sector assistance. There is a widespread sense that while the human resources working security cooperation are becoming more attuned to generating effective programs, there is still a general lack of awareness in designing assistance programs that are holistic, from tactical to institutional, and have the political and civilian institutional support to complement the program.

**Sustainment Concerns.** Several respondents spoke to concerns with the sustainability of 1206 programs, particularly given the two-year nature of 1206 funding. Many admitted that early 1206 programs are being sustained with FMF funding, which obviously displaces FMF authority funding from other projects. Beyond the question of whether these projects can be sustained by U.S. funding is a larger issue of whether they are even sustainable, and whether the host nation has the institutional strength to provide the support needed to sustain these projects over the long-term.

**Efficiency vs. Effectiveness.** The security cooperation issue is still being examined as one of efficiency (overlap, redundancy, coordination, etc.) but it is more likely the case that the central problem is one of strategic design, effectiveness, and return on investment. Of course there are gaps and overlapping efforts in the patchwork, and the process is horribly inefficient and slow, but that is not the best or most accurate explanation for ineffective security cooperation. The various programs lack common frames of reference. As a result, implementers and those who assess the effectiveness of the programs are constrained in their ability to see and understand both the physical and non-physical environment. Better tools are required to present data to have a clear baseline against which to measure effectiveness and efficiency and to provide feedback.

**Lack of Global Coherence.** While there is a clear sense that regional security cooperation investments are generally consistent with regional engagement priorities, and DoS and DoD have a general agreement on these allocations and the theater plan, this is not the case across the regions. OSD is attempting to reconcile this issue by expanding an earlier prototype to “rack and stack” the PACOM priorities.

**Building vs. Improving Capability.** One of the general themes of the various case studies of success and failure is that it is exceedingly difficult to “build” brand new capability where it does not already exist, and that these efforts tend to fail. However, investments to improve or reinforce existing capabilities are more likely to succeed. “Building” partner capacity, particularly in a conflict-afflicted country, is likely beyond U.S. means, and at least requires far more time than anticipated. Building the tactical “teeth” skills takes considerably less time than building the institutional logistical support, and even that takes less time than developing the civilian institutions of governance and rule of law that are necessary to complement the security capabilities. Thus “reinforcing” partner capacity is a more reasonable U.S. goal for security assistance. Moreover, building the logistical tail after the tactical “teeth” is logical when faced with the urgency of conflict, but unsupported tactical troops will falter due to attrition and poor morale, which can become a strategic
liability to the broader security assistance effort. Therefore, it is worth re-thinking the logic of building tactical level forces well before institutional support mechanisms are in place.

**Importance of regionalization.** The infrastructure is still very country-focused, but many of these problems are regional in nature, particularly in the South China Sea case, or even more so in Africa. Investing in multilateral or regional constructs could mitigate the risk of lagging political will in particular nations, but this requires a separate effort to invest in buttressing the integrity of these multilateral and regional organizations.

**Transparency of Resourcing Data.** Aggregating and analyzing SSA expenditures is difficult because of the various accounting methodologies utilized, and the lack of a central database. State's accounts are organized by traditional authority and by country, and both State and DSCA have a reasonably good handle on this data. But data on Defense programs that use Operations and Maintenance (O&M) to fund security assistance activities across authorities is much harder to compile.

**The SSA PPD has not been implemented.** The NSC should reinvigorate attention to managing the continued reform of security assistance, particularly with the growing awareness of significant policy failures juxtaposed with the administration's growing emphasis on the importance of partnerships.

**Poor Risk Mitigation.** There is very little awareness or discussion within the administration, particularly within the Defense Department, about the downside risks of the rush to rapidly expand security cooperation.

**Figure 12. The Future of Security Sector Assistance (SSA)**

Despite increased emphasis on SSA, unresolved issues cloud its future.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Definition</th>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
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<td>ITEF</td>
<td>Iraq Train and Equip Fund</td>
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<td>Combatant Commander</td>
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**Title 10**

CJCS Authorities
- COCOM Initiative Fund
  - USC 10 S. 166(a)
  - 1991
  - None

POTUS Authorities
- Reserve Mobilization
  - USC 10 S. 12304
  - 1973
  - None

SecDef Authorities
- Surplus Air Force War Material
  - USC 10 S. 9681
  - 1920
  - None
- Surplus War Sales
  - USC 10 S. 4681
  - 1920
  - None
- Foreign Students at West Point
  - USC 10 S. 4344
  - 1946
  - None
- Leasing
  - USC 10 S. 2667
  - 1947
  - None
- R&D Projects
  - USC 10 S. 2358
  - 1947
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**SecDef Authorities**

| Special Defense Acquisition Fund | AECA S. 51 | 1980 | None |

**SecState Authorities**

| Coordination with Foreign Policy | USC 22 S. 2382 | 1961 | NA |
| Proliferation Assistance        | USC 22 S. 2349(bb) | 2002 | NA |
| Reconstruction and Stabilization | USC 22 S. 2734 | 2008 | NA |

**Title 50**

| International Border Security    | USC 50 S. 2333 | 1996 | None |
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20. Building Special Operations Partnerships in Afghanistan and Beyond, Challenges and Best Practices from Afghanistan, Iraq, and Colombia, RAND, 2013
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